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 This thesis seeks to identify if collectible sneakers can provide diversification benefits 
to an investor’s portfolio. Using data from a global collectible sneaker marketplace, StockX, I 
constructed an index to compare it with other traditional assets, including the S&P 500 index 
and 5-year US Treasury Bills. By calculating key metrics including expected returns, 
volatility, and correlation, I analyzed the risk-return characteristics of the collectible sneaker 
asset class compared to other traditional asset classes. From the data analysis I performed, I 
found that collectible sneakers did not outperform returns significantly compared to 
traditional asset classes, but had low correlations, which provides investors with 
diversification benefits. I also found that an investor’s knowledge on sneakers and sneaker 
trends were also a significant determining factor in improving the expected returns from 
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1. Introduction 
 The ever-increasing influence of globalization has created new wealth for many 
individuals. With the newly accumulated wealth, investors will rationally try to find the most 
beneficial mix of assets in which to allocate their savings. The increasing amount of wealth 
that high net worth individuals (HNWI) have has contributed to the rise of many new 
alternative asset classes. As individuals try to find new areas to allocate their savings, they 
have found that opportunities within the traditional asset classes such as the stock market 
have decreased as the number of investors entering the market trying to profit from smaller 
margins and higher risk has grown. It has been tougher for investors to consistently achieve 
high returns when investing in conventional asset classes compared to previously. According 
to PWC’s recent report on alternative assets, this has led to a recent trend in the growth of 
alternative asset classes with investors looking for different ways to increase the benefits of 
diversification by seeking out alternative assets in which to invest. However, the evidence on 
diversification benefits of a few of the relatively more unfamiliar asset classes is missing. An 
example of one of the more unusual collectible markets is sneakers. There is little evidence 
about whether investing in this type of collectible will add diversification benefits to an 
investor’s portfolio. 
 Collectible and sought-after sneakers have been the latest commodity to grow from a 
niche market into the mainstream. Investment bank Cowen Inc. has noted that relatively low 
barriers to entry coupled with returns that tend to match or even surpass traditional asset 
classes has been a major driving force behind the increasing number of millennials and 
working age adults investing in both the stock market whilst purchasing sneakers to hold and 
eventually liquidate a few years down the line.  
 This paper seeks to analyze potential diversification benefits that alternative assets, 
such as collectible sneakers, can generate for an investor’s existing portfolio. We try to 
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closely examine the following three points to determine the risk-return trade-off in investing 
in sneakers:  
1. What diversification benefits can sneakers bring to a portfolio? How does volatility and   
correlation of a sneaker index compare to a stock index? 
2. What are the expected risk-adjusted returns on a sneaker investment? Are there any 
potential implications that we can derive from the Sharpe ratio? 
3. How can we best allocate sneakers to fit in our portfolio and mitigate risk?  
 
 From the data and empirical models I analyzed, I found that collectible sneakers do 
not promise as high a return as I initially assumed. However, it does provide a high degree of 
diversification benefit as its correlation is relatively low when I compared it with the S&P 
500 index and 5-year US Treasury T-bills. Upon closer review, I found that similar to other 
asset classes, having the ability to understand the fundamentals of an asset is key in 
identifying profitable investment opportunities. By comparing the data on pre-release and 
post-release sneaker returns, I found that market knowledge in sneakers will improve 











2. Literature Review 
 Non-traditional asset classes, including collectibles, have generally outperformed 
traditional asset classes such as governments bonds and gold, according to Dimson et al. 
(2013). The average returns that these alternative assets have generated have been higher 
compared to traditional assets and this has led investors, especially high-net-worth 
individuals (HNWI), to seek out new avenues to allocate their wealth. In Knight Frank’s 
2014 Wealth Report, they highlight an evolving investor trend with HNWIs in China 
beginning to allocate their wealth to luxury items that align with their personal interests, such 
as wine and art. Investment bank Cowen Inc. has found that this relatively new trend has led 
to the emergence of several new alternative asset classes, with sneakers being the latest asset 
class that many investors have started to take notice of. A publication written by Enterprise 
noted how the asset class’ low-risk nature along with relatively higher returns compared to 
traditional asset classes appealed to many investors. 
 Dimson et al. (2013) closely examine the financial returns from investments in 
collectible assets. They analyzed investments in four different alternative asset classes, 
including art, stamps, violins and other collectibles such as wine and diamonds and compared 
each to traditional assets including equities, governments bonds and bills. They took the asset 
data from existing research papers and marketplaces for each of the respective assets to find 
the geometric and arithmetic mean returns per annum. They also found the standard deviation 
and the lowest and highest recorded return from 1900-2012. The data was displayed in a table 
and the authors created a section for nominal return and another section for real returns, 
which were adjusted for inflation. The authors found that the correlation among the 
alternative asset classes were high and the correlation between alternative and traditional 
asset classes were low. 
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 The authors also showed how correlations with equity returns indicated that there was 
a relationship between wealth generated in the traditional equity market and with alternative 
collectible prices.  The finding of a low correlation between the alternative and traditional 
asset classes is consistent with the understanding that investors may have when investing in 
alternative asset classes to diversify their portfolios. The paper also focuses closely on 
transaction costs which are a major factor when purchasing and selling alternative asset 
classes. Although they recognize that transaction costs can lower the attractiveness of holding 
alternative assets, they find that investors enjoy having collectibles in their possession, which 
mitigates the effect of these transaction costs and hence make alternative assets attractive in 
comparison to traditional assets. 
 Dobrynskaya et al. (2018) examine another alternative asset, specifically LEGO sets. 
Cowen Inc. note that as opportunities in traditional asset classes have become increasingly 
competitive and returns from investments have decreased, investors are seeking new 
opportunities to diversify their investment portfolios. In this paper, the authors take data from 
several LEGO trading platforms to create a sample of 2,322 different LEGO sets. They 
constructed a LEGO price index from 1987-2015 using hedonic regression coefficients to 
account for the internal and external characteristics that may affect the value of each LEGO 
set. Interestingly, they find that LEGO sets are slightly negatively correlated with bonds and 
slightly positively correlated with stocks. 
 From their analysis, they also calculated a Sharpe ratio1 of 0.4 and a positive skew 
which indicates that LEGO sets are a viable alternative asset class given their performance 
returns-wise. The authors also find that LEGO sets are not strongly affected by potential 
issues that may affect the investment performance of LEGO sets such as an underwhelming 
 
1 The Sharpe ratio is a metric that investors use to measure an asset’s investment performance. It takes risk and 
return into account to find out if the asset is worth investing in based on the investor’s preferred risk and return. 
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market and high volatility. This finding is in line with their initial belief that collectibles are 
an attractive alternative asset class with a strong possibility of a relatively large upside when 
compared to returns from the S&P 500 index.  
 Art has been an alternative asset class that has been more widely studied compared to 
other alternative asset classes such as sneakers and LEGO sets. In the paper by Mamarbachi 
et al. (2020), the authors discuss how art can add value and be a beneficial asset to add to an 
individual’s portfolio if they are looking to diversify their assets. They attribute this to a 
potential for substantial price appreciation. In this paper, the authors analyze returns on art 
compared to the following composite indexes: NYSE, S&P 500, FTSE 100, hedge funds, 
bonds and real estate. They find that art provides investors with relatively higher returns 
compared to the composite indexes of the other asset classes. 
 However, the authors of the paper also acknowledge several issues that may hinder 
the performance of art investments including the general illiquidity of high-value artwork and 
high transaction costs. High-value art pieces often sell at auctions which take place on a 
predetermined date usually organized by the auction house. In relative terms, art does not 
have the same trading volume as other collectibles such as sneakers or LEGO sets because of 
there often is only one piece of any specific artwork. This factor, along with high transaction 
costs, may make art seem slightly less attractive as an investment compared to other 
traditional and alternative asset classes. However, Mamarbachi et al. (2020) found that 
returns on art investments generally outperform traditional asset classes significantly, making 
it a potentially favorable option for investors looking to diversify their portfolios beyond the 
traditional asset classes. 
 Ma et al. (2020) explores hedonic pricing within the sneaker resale market. Although 
they do not primarily focus on the investment performance of sneakers, the paper’s extensive 
research on the hedonic pricing of sneakers, and the external and internal factors that 
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influence the value of each sneaker, provide valuable insight to this paper. The paper 
provides evidence on factors that affect the best time to enter and exit a particular sneaker. 
The authors use Twitter as a means of forecasting the “hype” around a product and hence 
predicting the eventual post-release values. The authors scraped data from StockX, which is a 
global marketplace that allows users to buy and sell sneakers and various other collectibles 
on the platform. The factors that Ma et al. have highlighted are specific to the sneaker market 
and gives us a strong benchmark in understanding how sneakers may perform relative to 



















3. The Market for Sneakers  
I. Overview 
 The sneaker market has evolved significantly since the time footwear was 
manufactured on an industrial scale. Sneakers in the past were viewed by many as a 
necessity; they were an essential article of clothing for daily activities. However, as sports 
and culture developed, sneakers became more than just clothing; it gradually became a 
symbol of an individual’s personality. Sneakers evolved from being a part of everyday 
clothing into a collectible, coveted product. With a global growth in pop culture through sport 
and music, sneakers began to be viewed differently. Brands pushed to associate themselves 
with the most relevant, successful celebrities and frequently collaborated with sport stars and 
musicians to create footwear products that people desired.   
 In the article by Battle, the sneaker market grew exponentially larger at a rapid pace 
since the mid 2000-s. There was a marked shift in the sneaker market with sneaker investors 
starting to enter the market. These investors were usually sneaker enthusiasts themselves and 
they would purchase several sneakers at retail prices to sell at resale prices. At the time, profit 
margins were not as large and investments were usually on a small scale. As technology 
developed, sneaker marketplaces started to become the norm in early 2015. With a 
standardized marketplace, it propelled the sneaker market incredibly quickly. Buyers could 
purchase an authentic pair of sneakers and sellers could sell their sneakers on these global 
sneaker marketplaces.  
 Currently, the two largest US-based companies, StockX and GOAT, have 
authentication facilities across the world and both companies have made global sneaker 
transactions seamless. Users can now list, purchase and sell their sneakers in minutes and 
receive their payouts within several days. The rise of sneaker marketplaces advanced the 
industry as a whole because it brought in many new entrants that may not have been sneaker 
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enthusiasts previously. Non-sneaker enthusiasts entered the market with an investor’s 
mindset and this meant that the industry was becoming larger even though the number of 
sneaker collectors and average consumers was growing at a relatively slower rate. The 
advancement of sneaker marketplaces is unofficially recognized to be the main driving factor 
behind the growth of the sneaker industry and the entire asset class as noted by Canaan 
Partners. 
 
II. Sneaker Collectors, Consumers and Investors 
 Within a sneaker market, there are three different groups of individuals: sneaker 
collectors, average consumers and sneaker investors. Throughout this paper, I will also refer 
to three different prices: pre-release price, retail price and post-release price. Each of these 
three prices belongs to a specific category within the sneaker timeline and relates to the 





 Sneaker collectors are classified as individuals that will purchase sneakers for display 
or for their own use. Sneaker collectors are mostly insensitive to prices and will purchase 
sneakers at resale prices without much consideration as they are often fixated on adding the 
pair into their collection. These collectors will tend to purchase the sneakers at pre-release 
and retail prices. 
 Average consumers are defined as individuals that purchase sneakers for daily use 
and tend to only purchase sneakers at retail prices; if they do pay resale prices, it will be 














they will typically not purchase the sneakers at the resale price. Average consumers also tend 
not to sell their shoes on because they prefer to wear their shoes regardless of the resale 
value.  
 Lastly, sneaker investors are individuals that are the most sensitive to prices as they 
look to make a profit on their sneaker purchases. This group of individuals within the sneaker 
market try to purchase sneakers at both retail and resale prices to gain a profit. Whilst the 
margins are much higher when a sneaker investor purchases a sneaker at the retail price, it 
takes considerably more effort and is much more difficult to attain. For example, a pair of Air 
Force 1’s manufactured by Nike in 2019, which were nicknamed the ‘Travis Scott Sail’, 
retailed at $150. Sneaker investors that managed to get it at the retail price of $150 were 
selling it at an average price of $300 post-release. They were able to pocket the $150 and 
move onto the next release. Whilst some sneaker investors managed to secure pairs for $150, 
others speculated on the growth of the silhouette and purchased pairs at the post-release price 
of $300 and held onto them. This act of purchasing a sneaker at resale prices to hold is 
similar to buying into a stock or an index in this case. These sneaker investors believe that the 
asset is worth holding onto despite the risks and the opportunity cost of money.  
 
III. Risks from Sneaker Investing 
i. Physical Damage 
 One of the inherent risks of investing in sneakers is preserving the sneaker in its 
original condition. When an investor holds onto a sneaker, it can be exposed to external 
conditions including humidity and sunlight which can damage the materials on the sneaker. 
Other issues including oxidation will make the soles turn yellow and decrease the aesthetic 
aspect of the sneaker, which will decrease the value of the sneaker. Storing sneakers for a 
long period of time can also lead to other age-related defects such as crumbling and 
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disintegration of the upper and midsole. The risks that sneaker investors undertake are large; 
small defects and damages from holding the sneaker from too long can erode the gains from 
holding the sneaker in an unworn condition. To minimize the likelihood of these problems 
occurring, a survey I conducted found that sneaker investors have invested in shrink 
wrapping machines to wrap each sneaker and warehouses to hold their inventory, but these 
solutions add an additional cost to holding the sneaker. 
 
ii. Liquidity  
 Liquidity is an important aspect for any asset class, but it has a much larger emphasis 
when it comes to alternative asset classes such as collectibles due to the scarce nature of these 
items. In general, the liquidity of a sneaker will depend on the design of the sneaker itself. An 
aesthetically-pleasing, sought-after sneaker will undoubtedly be easier to sell. If consumer 
preferences change, demand will also shift and hence the liquidity of a particular sneaker will 
also be affected. Additionally, prices are also a determining factor in the liquidity of sneakers. 
Sneakers with higher trading volumes tend to have a narrowed bid-ask spread whereas 
sneakers that are rarer with lower trading volumes have larger bid-ask spreads which can 
affect the liquidity of the sneaker. This is because having a larger bid-ask spread means that 
the market price in the eyes of the buyer and seller are different and hence it may be harder to 
liquidate the sneaker due to each party having differing opinions on the value of the sneaker.  
 
iii. Economic Outlook 
 The health and outlook of the global economy plays a significant role in the sneaker 
market. In times of economic downturns, consumers have less disposable income and hence 
they will allocate their money differently. A shift away from the purchase of sneakers will 
cause a ripple effect throughout the sneaker market. As average consumers purchase less 
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often and prefer lower-priced over higher-priced sneakers, sneaker investors have to hold 
their sneakers out for a longer period of time until the economy improves which decreases 
their overall returns. This is because they will now be holding large amounts of inventory 
with effectively no returns until the economy improves and they can liquidate their inventory 
at market prices. This presents a large opportunity cost for sneaker investors and timing the 
entry and exit points will be imperative. 
 
iv. Opportunity Cost of Time 
 Sneaker transactions seem simple and effortless on paper; buyers purchase sneakers 
from sellers and sellers sell their sneakers to buyers. However, the entire process involves 
many more steps. From the seller’s perspective, they will need to list it on several different 
platforms and marketplaces, take photos and constantly reply to any questions or queries that 
a consumer may ask. Shipping and meet-ups are currently the two most commonly forms to 
transact. On platforms that are non-binding, such as Facebook or Instagram, buyers may not 
actually end up purchasing the good and may simply not show up for a scheduled meet-up. 
Unfortunately, sellers are unable to avoid this from occurring and hence they will lose out on 
the time they took trying to arrange the transaction. On the other hand, from a buyer’s 
perspective, the seller may choose to not honor a sale if they received a higher offer from 
another buyer. Even if a transaction is mutually agreed on, a seller may back out of the 
transaction without giving any reason. Therefore, the buyer will lose out on the time spent 
negotiating with the seller.  
 
v. Transaction Costs 
 One significant aspect of sneaker investing is the cost of transacting a sale. There are 
many different methods of selling sneakers; when selling, individuals tend to sell the 
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products through social media or marketplaces. When selling on social media, it is considered 
to be unregulated as sellers can list anything and any mutually agreed transactions are 
technically non-binding. Sneaker authenticity is closely related to this as it presents a major 
issue for both buyers and sellers. Selling on social media platforms such as Facebook 
Marketplace does not guarantee that the buyer receives an authentic product. Therefore, 
buyers may tend to want photos and proof of purchase. A confirmation of a deal through a 
Facebook message also does not confirm that the transaction will go through. If a seller 
arranges a meet-up to sell a pair of sneakers and the buyer does not show up although the 
buyer confirmed that they will be purchasing the sneaker, there is nothing the seller can do. 
This relates back to the above section where I discussed the opportunity cost of time when 
trying to buy and sell sneakers. Hence, due to this problem within unregulated marketplaces, 
there tends to be a slight discount in prices to compensate for the risks and opportunity costs 
involved for both buyers and sellers.  
 On the other hand, regulated marketplaces including GOAT and StockX are 
comparatively more efficient and the process is much more seamless. When selling on a 
regulated marketplace, a seller lists their product on the marketplace and they will only need 
to ship it to the authenticators at the marketplace once the buyer has paid for the sneaker in 
full. Sellers save time by not needing to take photos of the sneakers and provide proof of 
authenticity. This also means that the buyer can no longer back out of the transaction as their 
payment method will be charged as soon as the transaction is confirmed. However, this 
convenience comes at a cost and these marketplaces charge sellers approximately 10% to 
cover their authentication and payment processing costs according to an article published by 




IV. Sneaker Market Phenomena 
 The sneaker market has distinct characteristics which sets it apart from alternative 
asset classes. In this section, I will discuss the two main causes of sneaker price fluctuations 
which are unique to this market. 
 
i. Pre-Release 
 Before a sneaker is released, sneaker-related news outlets often release mockups and 
leaked photos of an actual sneaker. This creates excitement and hype amongst sneaker fans. 
Occasionally, these sneakers make it to the market before the slated release date and there are 
individuals that purchase them early at a much higher price just to have them before the 
release date. The higher prices are due to the difficult nature of acquiring an authentic pair 
before the sneaker’s release date. Sneaker retailers and boutiques are technically not allowed 
to sell these sneakers before the release date, so any pairs that are released early are a breach 
of contract with the sneaker manufacturer itself, which naturally is a high-risk decision for 
the retailers and boutiques. This risk is reflected through the high pre-release prices. Pre-
release prices tend to be several times higher than regular post-release resale prices, which 
often are higher than the retail prices. 
 
ii. Restocks 
 A restock is a phenomenon that is specific to the sneaker market and does not 
normally occur within other alternative asset classes. Alternative asset classes including 
wines and art cannot be replicated or reproduced. For example, wine-makers can’t regrow 
grapes from their 2002 harvest to make wine in 2021. This example shows how the nature of 
the comparatively more traditional alternative assets differs significantly from sneakers. 
Although restocks tend to be rare due to brands wanting to create hype and preserve 
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exclusivity, sneakers do occasionally have restocks. This can be due to certain factors, 
including brands trying to boost their quarterly revenues or to simply make the product more 
accessible for their fans.  
 Regardless of the motivation behind a restock, restocks can affect the demand and 
appeal of a sneaker. A large restock of a pair of sneakers with a resale price just above the 
retail price could potentially decrease the appeal of a sneaker just because consumers that 
purchase these products tend to want exclusivity and the fact that the product is now more 
accessible can decrease the overall demand of the product. A smaller restock can also 
decrease the overall appeal of a sneaker, however, resale prices tend to maintain constant. 
The reason why sneaker investors classify restocks as small or large is because brands do not 
officially announce the exact number of pairs being restocked. Therefore, it is difficult to 
gauge how a restock has impacted resale prices, demand, and supply and this is why sneaker 
investors tend to either classify a restock being small or large. Brands need to be strategic 
when striking the right balance between supply and demand for these exclusive sneakers 
otherwise they risk losing out on the public perception of their product being exclusive.  
 The sneaker market is similar to the stock market in the sense that there is always 
news about sneakers and the stock market in the media. The sneaker market is often flooded 
with information on new products, rumored releases and potential restocks. With a large 
amount of news to process and filter through for legitimacy and validity, forecasting restocks 
is not an easy task; it requires experience and extensive knowledge of the sneaker market. 
However, it is not entirely impossible. An investor in the sneaker market can observe market 
trends with experience. Although an experienced investor may not be able to accurately 
predict it correctly all the time, there is a high likelihood that they will predict it correctly 
most of the time. Recently, Adidas has been identified by sneaker investors as a brand which 
is highly likely to restock pairs. Therefore, investors have been increasingly cautious about 
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holding pairs from the brand. Similar to insider trading, there are also sneaker investors that 
have connections to employees within a company and as a result, they gain an unfair 

























 In this paper, I gathered data from both traditional and alternative asset classes to 
analyze how sneakers as an asset class fare compared to the S&P 500 index with dividends in 
terms of returns. I scraped all the sneaker data from the global sneaker marketplace called 
StockX. It is currently the most transparent and expansive marketplace which tracks sneaker 
transactions. I used a custom Python scraper tool which gathered data from 30 different 
random sneaker designs from the website’s ‘Featured’ page, which is a showcase of random 
sneakers in no particular order or brand. The 30 random sneakers I used to construct the 
sneaker index can be found in Appendix A. This method was chosen to ensure that the 
composite sneaker index I constructed consisted of the widest breadth of sneakers to get a 
reliable representation of various sneakers. 
 From there, I converted the scraped data into a Microsoft Excel file with the following 
categories: name of product, date, price sold at and whether there has been a restock. For 
each sneaker on the marketplace, there were 100 different data points. The time period 
between each data point depends on the release date of the sneaker. An older sneaker has 
longer time periods between each data point whilst a newer sneaker has shorter time periods.  
 When constructing the ‘Sneakers: Pre-Release’ index, I excluded all the data points 
before the official release date. For example, if a sneaker released on the 6th of February 
2019, I excluded all the data points before the release date so that the index was adjusted for 
pre-release prices. On the other hand, when constructing the ‘Sneakers: Restocks’ index, I 
removed the data points following the restock. If a sneaker restocked on the 10th of March 
2020, I excluded all the data points occurring after the restock date. By excluding the data 
points after the restock, I was able to create the index adjusted for restock data. 
 Then, I collated all the data from the Microsoft Excel file to create the three different 
sneaker indexes which I compared with the S&P 500 index. As each sneaker had a different 
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release date, I grouped all the sneakers with data from a specific month and year, added all 
the expected returns and divided it by the number of sneakers with data within the specific 
time period to come up with an aggregated return for each month of each year for which I 
had data. 
 I used the scraped data to find the returns on each individual sneaker each month 
since its release to see if there were any underlying trends that may have impacted the results 
when compared to traditional asset classes. I did this to ensure that the sneaker dataset was 
random and not biased. For the S&P 500 index including dividends, I retrieved the data on 
the index by using YCharts’ database. The database had data on the opening and closing 
price of each trading day along with the monthly returns of the S&P 500 index including 
dividends. Then, I entered all the data into Microsoft Excel and calculated each compounded 
monthly return by taking the data points from the closing value of the S&P 500 index from 
the first and last trading day of each month. One of the reasons why I selected the first and 
last trading days of each month is because the trading dates across the sneaker and stock 
market were difficult to match. Sneakers trade continuously throughout the year whereas the 
stock market has specific non-trading days due to public holidays and weekends. Taking data 
from the opening and closing trading dates of each month allowed me to match the data 
points in a consistent manner which reduced potential fluctuations compared to if I were to 
interpolate the data points to account for the S&P 500’s non-trading days. 
 When using the Markowitz model to identify the optimal portfolio allocation for the 
different traditional and alternative asset classes, I used the 5-year US Treasury Bill rates to 
calculate the average risk-free rate of return to use for my model. I chose the 5-year rates as it 
was the time period which was the closest match to my dataset for the various asset classes. I 
aggregated the 5-year rates for each month beginning from the start to the end of my dataset 
and took the average 5-year rate to use in the Markowitz model. The expected returns, 
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standard deviation, correlation, and Sharpe ratio for the model were calculated using the 

























5. Empirical Models and Results 
I. Compounded Monthly Returns 
 To calculate the index returns for both the sneaker and S&P 500 index, I used the 






𝒏 − 𝟏 = 𝒓𝒕 
𝑡: number of months between two observed data points 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 
𝑃0: value of the sneaker/S&P 500 index at time 𝑥 
𝑃1: value of the sneaker/S&P 500 index at time 𝑦 
𝑛: number of months between 𝑃0 and 𝑃1 
where 𝑟𝑡 is the compounded monthly return. 
 
 I used the above formula to calculate all the compounded monthly returns in a 
Microsoft Excel file. As previously stated in the data section, I used the opening and closing 
trading dates of each month for each of the indexes to ensure that the timing for the data 
points were matched, eliminating the need to interpolate the data thus reducing the standard 
deviation. 
 
II. Sharpe Ratio 
 I also used the Sharpe ratio formula below to analyze how sneakers and the S&P 500 





𝑆𝑎: Sharpe ratio for asset 𝑎 over time period 𝑏 
𝐸: expected returns 
𝑅𝑎: asset returns 𝑎 returns 
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𝑅𝑏: risk-free rate of return over time period 𝑏 





Index Number: Name of Index: Sharpe Ratio (𝑆𝑎): 
1 S&P 500 0.2981 
2 Sneakers -0.4984 
3 Sneakers: Pre-Release 0.6893 
4 Sneakers: Restocks 0.7568 
 
 The Sharpe ratio calculations in table 1 except for the sneaker index which has not 
been adjusted for pre-release and restock data show that the three out of the four indexes are 
worth investing in. The sample period in table 1 was between February 2017 and March 
2021. The S&P 500’s Sharpe ratio of 0.2981 is higher than the sneaker index’s Sharpe ratio, 
which is a negative value. The negative value indicates that the investment is not sound and 
the investor should not enter into the investment at it is loss-making. However, the sneaker 
indexes which were adjusted for pre-release and restock data showed that sneakers are a 
better investment compared to the S&P 500.  
 The Sharpe ratios for the pre-release and restock-adjusted sneaker indexes are almost 
two times higher than the S&P 500. However, it must be noted that investors must have a 
strong understanding in sneakers to avoid purchasing sneakers at pre-release prices and must 
be able to foresee restocks; otherwise, they may be exposed to risk-adjusted returns which are 
negative as exhibited from index 1. The Sharpe ratios for sneakers adjusted for pre-release 
and restock data are almost two times higher than the S&P 500, which highlights the 
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attractiveness of sneakers as an asset to investors that currently have allocated their wealth in 
sneakers. 
 
III. Markowitz Model 
 Lastly, I used the Markowitz model which looks at how a portfolio can be constructed 
and optimized. The model tries to find the efficient frontier; for a given level of risk, it will 
try to find the highest return. The Markowitz model will provide us insight into how we can 
optimize traditional asset classes with alternative asset classes. Below are the equations I 
used in my Microsoft Excel file to calculate and estimate the portfolio with the highest 
reward-to-variability and the most optimal portfolio given a risk aversion coefficient. 
 
Portfolio expected returns: 




𝑅𝑝: expected returns on portfolio 
𝑥𝑖: weight of total portfolio in asset 𝑖 
𝑅𝑖: expected returns from asset 𝑖 
 
Portfolio standard deviation: 
𝜎𝑝 =  √∑ 𝑤𝑖
2𝜎𝑖







𝜎𝑝: standard deviation of portfolio 
𝑤𝑖 : weight of asset 𝑖 in total portfolio 
𝜎𝑖: asset 𝑖 rate of return variance 
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𝑤𝑗 : weight of asset 𝑗 in total portfolio 
𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑗: assets 𝑖 and 𝑗 rate of return covariance 








































Markowitz Model (1.74% risk-free rate) 
 Expected Return  Standard Deviation Sharpe Ratio 
Portfolio 1 0.38% 4.2% 0.09 
Portfolio 2 0.79% 4.0% 0.19 
Portfolio 3 1.08% 3.5% 0.30 
Portfolio 4 0.43% 3.5% 0.12 
 Expected Return  Standard Deviation Sharpe Ratio 
Portfolio 1 0.38% 4.2% -0.32 
Portfolio 2 0.79% 4.0% -0.23 
Portfolio 3 1.08% 3.5% -0.18 
Portfolio 4 0.43% 3.5% -0.37 
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 Table 2 depicts the composition of the four different portfolios which I constructed to 
calculate the Sharpe ratios from investing different amounts into each index. Portfolios 1-3 
all include a 50% weight of the S&P 500 whilst the other 50% is invested into one of the 
other three sneaker indexes. Portfolio 4 consists of an equal 25% weight across all four 
indexes.  
 Table 3 shows each portfolio’s expected investment performance. Portfolio 3, which 
is composed of the S&P 500 and sneaker index adjusted for restocks, outperforms the other 
three portfolios with an expected return of 1.08% and standard deviation of 3.5%. The 
corresponding Sharpe ratio is 0.30 for portfolio 3, which is comparatively higher than the 
other portfolios. This aligns with the initial notion that sneakers are an alternative asset that 
provide satisfactory expected returns along with benefits from diversification. However, 
sneaker investors need to be well-versed about the sneaker market. This is evidenced in 
portfolio 1, which is an equal split between the S&P 500 and the sneaker index not adjusted 
for pre-release and restocks. Portfolio 1 is the poorest performing portfolio amongst the four 
portfolios with a Sharpe ratio of 0.09.  
 In table 4, I calculated the Sharpe ratios using the average 5-year US Treasury bill 
data from 2017 to 2021. The risk-free rate I derived from the dataset was 1.74%. This is 
significantly higher than the expected returns in any of the four portfolios. Hence, all the 
Sharpe ratios had negative values, indicating that the investments were not worth entering. 
However, the data may have been skewed slightly since there is not a significant amount of 
data on sneakers available. The data I collected from 2017-2021 only spans close to 5 years, 
which is relatively short and therefore easily affected by erroneous data. Portfolio 3 has the 
highest Sharpe ratio value of -0.18 which is consistent with our findings in table 3, whereby 
portfolio 3 is the highest performing portfolio. However, one point to note is that portfolio 1 
outperforms portfolio 4 in table 4, which is unlike table 3.  
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Table 5 
Markowitz Portfolio Optimization Model 
 
 S&P 500 Sneakers  Sneakers: Pre-Release Sneakers: Restocks 
 
 39.8%        5.0%   12.4%    42.8% 
 
Expected Return: 0.87% 
 
Standard Deviation: 3.49% 
 
Sharpe Ratio: 0.249 
 
  
 Using Markowitz’s portfolio optimization model, I calculated the most optimal 
portfolio weighting given the expected returns, correlations, standard deviation, and 
covariance data from each index. I used Microsoft Excel’s solver function to calculate the 
portfolio with the most optimal return-to-variability. Using the Sharpe ratio as the objective 
function, the weights as the variable cells and a minimum constraint of 5% invested in each 
index to ensure that the portfolio consisted of all four indexes, I calculated the metrics as 
shown in table 5.  
 Table 5 shows that the optimal portfolio comprises mainly of the ‘Sneakers: 
Restocks’ index with a weight of 42.8%. The S&P 500 is also a strong index to invest in with 
an allocation of 39.8%. The ‘Sneakers: Pre-Release’ and ‘Sneakers’ index have the lowest 
weights compared to the aforementioned indexes. This relationship is consistent with the 
metrics that I calculated in previous tables, whereby both indexes had comparatively lower 
risk-adjusted returns when compared to the ‘Sneakers: Restocks’ and S&P 500 indexes.  
 The Sharpe ratio of this optimal portfolio is similar to portfolio 3 in table 3, which is 
the portfolio that invests into both the S&P 500 and ‘Sneakers: Restocks’ indexes equally. 
The expected return in portfolio 3 is slightly higher compared to the optimal portfolio whilst 
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the standard deviation is virtually identical; the optimal portfolio shares similar risk-return 
characteristics with portfolio 3. This aligns with our findings that the highest performing 
indexes, the S&P 500 and the ‘Sneakers: Restocks’ indexes, are the indexes that we will want 
to invest as much as we can into. One of the reasons why the expected return in this optimal 
portfolio is slightly lower than portfolio 3 is because of the constraints that I set. I set a 
minimum investment allocation constraint of 5% because I wanted the optimal portfolio to 
factor in the benefits from the low correlations between the S&P 500 and sneaker indexes as 
evidenced in Figure 5. The correlation between the unadjusted ‘Sneakers’ index and the S&P 
500 is the lowest with a value of 0.22; investing into the unadjusted ‘Sneaker’ index will 
provide diversification benefits to a portfolio even though the expected return is low. 
 Depending on an investor’s risk profile, an investor is likely to choose to invest in the 
optimal portfolio if they are risk-averse. On the other hand, an investor that is willing to risk 
more will likely choose to invest solely into portfolio 3, which has the highest expected 
return, the lowest standard deviation, and the highest corresponding Sharpe ratio. For 
investors that prioritize diversification and a portfolio with the lowest risk, the results from 
table 3 show that portfolio 4 is another viable option. With equal investments into each of the 
four indexes, a moderate expected return of 0.43% and a comparatively low standard 










 I hypothesized that the returns from sneakers would be higher than returns from 
traditional asset classes such as the S&P 500. However, it turns out to be that if an investor 
was to invest into sneakers, the expected returns may be significantly lower than that of the 
S&P 500, especially in the case of the sneaker index which does not account for pre-release 
and restock prices. The investor must be able to identify and focus their investments on 
sneakers that they know will stay in trend by using information on restocks and historical 
sneaker data. As seen from the data and tables above, going in blind into a sneaker 
investment may not be the wisest method; the sneaker indexes which are adjusted for pre-
release and restock prices outperform the index without the adjustment.  
 Figure 5 which calculates index correlations reaffirms my initial assumption on the 
relatively low correlations between the S&P 500 and sneaker index. The low correlations can 
offer investors insulation from market volatility on their investment portfolio. The 
diversifications benefits derived from sneakers not only provide investors with protection 
from volatility, but the sneaker indexes can also deliver significant expected returns. Portfolio 
3’s comparatively high Sharpe ratio in table 3 also points out how the risk-return 
characteristics of an investment in a sneaker index, if well-designed and structured correctly, 
can be a suitable alternative option for investors. 
 Although the sneaker market is an alternative asset class that has still not fully 
matured, it is growing at a rapid pace. With Cowen Inc. estimating the sneaker resale market 
alone to be worth $30 billion by 2030, sneakers may become the next mainstay alternative 
asset class, alongside fine art and vintage wines. As sneakers become more well-documented 
and as global sneaker data availability increases, we can further build on the existing research 




7. Further Research 
 Collectible sneakers are still a relatively new alternative asset class and there is not a 
wide array of existing literature compared to other alternative asset classes. There is also no 
global marketplace which tracks each sneaker transaction done both offline and online. This 
means that there are inherently data limitations which can affect our analysis. As the sneaker 
market grows large, the need for a transparent composite global marketplace for sneakers will 
be greater than ever. A marketplace which tracks each pair of sneakers that has been 
manufactured will allow us to reliably perform our analysis with a greater range of products. 
StockX was unable to provide me with details on each specific transaction and hence the gaps 
between each data point varied and the method I used could have been improved if there 
were smaller gaps in the data points, along with an increased data and sample size. 
 Due to the nature of sneakers having various distinct price ranges as highlighted in the 
earlier section on the sneaker market, there is a high level of variability in the prices of 
sneakers. Within these large-scale variabilities, there may also be smaller-scale variabilities 
that may occur due to measurement errors when currency fluctuations are not accurately 
accounted for when sales are transacted. Issues that compound the variability errors may also 
arise because of the platform the sale is transacted on; the system may be prone to software 
errors that generates incorrect prices especially when simultaneous sales are transacted across 
a range of difference currencies in various countries. 
 As mentioned in the sneaker market overview, the transaction costs associated with 
the sale of a sneaker can also affect the data on our compounded monthly returns. However, 
we currently do not have a standardized global platform which tracks each transaction. It will 
be challenging to do so as transactions could occur either offline or online; for instance, a 
seller could conduct a transaction at a nearby park with cash and without any transaction fees. 
 28 
Gathering data for each successful sneaker transaction would be difficult unless governments 
globally convene and begin to enforce laws and restrictions on sneaker-related transactions. 
 To minimize sampling errors and increase the reliability of the data analysis that I 
may perform on a larger dataset in the future, I would also want to improve the method of 
random sampling. The method I used was based on StockX’s algorithm that is completely 
random, but I would try to use a different method in the future to ensure that StockX’s 
algorithm has no biases. StockX currently has cookies embedded within the website which 
tracks user behavior; by using an alternative randomization method, I can compare the results 
from both methods and identify if the data collection and the subsequent data analysis I 



















This figure shows the compounded monthly returns for both the S&P 500 index and the 
sneaker index which I constructed using data from StockX.  
Figure 2 
This figure shows the compounded monthly returns for both the S&P 500 index and the 






















Comparison of Monthly Index Returns: Pre-Release



























This figure shows the compounded monthly returns for both the S&P 500 index and the 






















Comparison of Monthly Index Returns: Restocks
Sneakers (Restocks) S&P 500
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Figure 4 
Summary Statistics (95% Significance) 
Figure 4: The summary statistics at the 95% significance are shown for the four different indexes in this figure. 
 
S&P 500  Sneaker Index  Sneaker Index: Pre-Release 
           
Mean 1.38840  Mean -0.6176791  Mean 0.19768137 
Standard Error 0.6585261  Standard Error 0.53015395  Standard Error 0.47368374 
Median 0.02015  Median -0.0518811  Median 0.26020824 
Mode #N/A  Mode #N/A  Mode #N/A 
Standard 
Deviation 4.6564826  
Standard 
Deviation 3.74875453  
Standard 
Deviation 3.34944988 
Sample Variance 2.168283  Sample Variance 14.0531605  Sample Variance 11.2188145 
Kurtosis 1.55634233  Kurtosis 0.62819775  Kurtosis 2.57901288 
Skewness -0.5724596  Skewness -0.6144904  Skewness -0.9974344 
Range 25.17  Range 18.4648831  Range 18.4648831 
Minimum -12.35  Minimum -11.709268  Minimum -11.709268 
Maximum 12.82  Maximum 6.75561519  Maximum 6.75561519 
Sum 69.42  Sum -30.883955  Sum 9.88406855 
Count 50  Count 50  Count 50 
 
 
Sneaker Index: Restocks 
  
Mean 0.77456382 

















The figure below shows the correlations between each of the four indexes. The S&P 500 
index data was obtained from YCharts. The data used to construct the sneaker indexes were 











































































































Adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Black Red CP9652 
Adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Cream/Triple White CP9366 
Adidas Ultra Boost 4.0 Running White BB6168 
Adidas Yeezy Boost 700 Wave Runner Solid Grey B75571 
Jordan 11 Retro Win Like 96 378037-623 
Adidas Yeezy 500 Utility Black F36640 
Jordan 11 Retro Concord (2018) 378037-100 
Nike Blazer Mid 77 Vintage White Black BQ6806-100 
Jordan 11 Retro Playoffs Bred (2019) 378037-061 
Jordan 1 Retro High Fearless UNC Chicago CK5666-100 
adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Yecheil (Non-Reflective) FW5190 
Jordan 1 Retro High Shattered Backboard 3.0 555088-028 
adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Citrin (Non-Reflective) FW3042 
adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Yeezreel (Non-Reflective) FW5191 
Jordan 4 Retro Bred (2019) 308497-060 
Nike Air Force 1 Low Supreme Black CU9225-001 
adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Carbon FZ5000 
Jordan 1 Retro High Tokyo Bio Hack 555088-201 
Jordan 12 Retro Black University Gold 130690-070 
Jordan 5 Retro Alternate Bel-Air DB3335-100 
Nike Air Max 95 OG Neon (2020) CT1689-001 
Jordan 1 Retro High Pine Green Black 555088-030 
Jordan 11 Retro Low Concord Bred AV2187-160 
adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Desert Sage FX9035 
Jordan 3 Retro SE Unite Fire Red CK5692-600 
Jordan 4 Retro SE 95 Neon CT5342-007 
Jordan 1 Retro High Twist (W) CD0461-007 
Jordan 1 Retro High Satin Black Toe (W) CD0461-016 
adidas Yeezy Boost 350 V2 Cloud White (Non-Reflective) FW3043 
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